Saturday, April 25, 2009

An early poem, for those who didn't like my short story :)

“Fine Fall Day”

On a fine fall day,
I went in search of spring;
I wandered through hill and vale
Watching to find that time when
I once saw love unfold.

I asked all I knew, gasping,
“Where am I to find the flowers,
and the palaces of the lord of my heart?
No one answered, and I was left to find where
I once saw love unfold.

I wished to sooth my loss.
Finding myself upon the river bank,
I wept tears of sorrow;
I knew not where it was where
I once saw love unfold.

But in my heart, I desired it so.
The raft beckoned for my presence;
Willing to bear me across the river of Babylon
To thence from where
I once saw love unfold.

I came to the edge of that boat;
To the bark, being none the lighter,
Whose pilot was the fisher-man.
He told me as he rowed,
“I once saw Love unfold.”

When at last the ship came
Near that otherly shore,
He showed me the way. He lent
The oar and I jumped to there from where
I was to see Love unfold.

I, having ended my journey,
Went to that field of roses
Where all joy is one. I flew,
Propelled by my joy’s wings,
To where I would see Love unfold.

In the midst of the field was a rose,
Red as only the heart is, tinged with blood;
I stooped my head, gazing, minding not the thorns,
Into the depths of its petals, and there,
I saw Love unfold.

Calvin, a Short Story

I found this short story on my computer; something I had written in high school.

WARNING: GRAPHIC CONTENT; NOT FOR THE WEAK OF HEART.

Yeah, it's got some blood and guts sort of stuff in it. But I forgot about it and think it might actually have some slight merit, although it rather smacks one in the face. And no, it has no autobiographical elements; it was an exercise in my early creative writing. Here it is:

Calvin

A Short Story


“Calvin, kiss your mother goodbye.” He was much too sophisticated for such things, so he left, pretending not to hear his father’s insistent call. Calvin had long found his mother annoying, and made this apparent whenever he saw her, generally becoming in his own right a nuisance. He could not find anything to like about her, and their falling out had to do with this.

The specific issue Calvin found least gratifying to bring up in her presence was God. He hated the idea – why would such a loving and all-powerful God allow suffering to occur? Especially today! With neutron bombs and all sorts of diseases that could eat the skin off people… it was too horrible to even imagine, let alone consider releasing it into the world. How could anyone truly and seriously, with a straight face, say that they believed that some dirty, stupid Jew from two-thousand years ago was the all-poweful God? This same Jew who died on a cross, who died because nobody really cared whether he lived or not, who died alongside two criminals – how could anyone believe he knew something we didn’t? Because he “rose again?” An empty tomb proves anything, of course; it even might prove that whole system of theology that has existed forever in the Catholic Church! Maybe someone someday will finally realize that the apostles could just have easily removed the body with little or no trouble!

What a waste of time and effort! When he was younger, he had almost bought into what his mother kept foisting on him since he was a child; that was, until he finally was able to realize the truth. When he was younger, he had even thought of becoming a priest! To think! He had grand dreams of offering the “mystical sacrifice of Calvalry,” and grandiose dreams of living just like his mother’s beloved Saint Francis. Now, he saw these to be pipedreams – dreams invented to pressure him to become another mindless goon of that Church his mother so loved. But he knew better! At his fifteenth birthday, his dreams were shattered – the party had to be canceled due to the declaration of war on the Grand Caliph’s forces.

Before he had known of it, his uncle and older brother had been sent to Europe to fight against the invading forces of the Caliph; fighting, like his mother, for their God. Now, of course, they had been dead for the past five years – as dead as the other three million soldiers who now could not even find room to be buried in their native soil, their corpses being shipped into the graveyards, lying festering upon the bare earth because they could not even make communal graves large enough to fit all the bodies. The Mass-saying industry was another instance of the Church hypocrisy throughout the whole time – people paid the priest’s confraternities to say series of Masses for the souls of those who had died.

The priests made a pretty penny in the matter, with three or so million dead men; the damned priests! How he hated them! Notwithstanding that he had wanted to be one – everyone he knew had! His mother could think of no greater goal in her life than to see her son give his life in either the service of the altar or the service of the air force.

He could not stop crying earlier as his parent’s had placed him in the shelter – nor could they at the time. He knew his mother was reading a book, sitting outside of the shelter in her favorite chair, as his father was pacing in the study. His sister – who could tell? He began to flip the panel half-heartedly, the small neat switches mocking him from their safe place. “Calvin, would you like to play a game?” the computer asked him. “Maybe later,” Calvin replied. He had nearly finished all the switches before he just leaned back into the pill shaped shelter. “More like a coffin, a place to die,” Calvin thought. But he also then remembered that wombs quite often resembled the tomb. “Well,” thought Calvin, “I suppose we all just live to die.” He sat back awaiting the impact of the first bomb when he heard the voice –

“Calvin, kiss your mother goodbye.” His mother’s voice was barely audible outside the barrier between himself and certain death; he could not explain how he could hear it – he just knew that it happened. He had not even tripped the locking mechanism, and the door soon opened slowly, with his mother holding up the hatch. He climbed out into the room, just as the bright flash – brighter than the sun – brighter than anything he had ever seen – enveloped him. After that point, there should have been no talk of seeing or hearing anything.

The lights were the first to go out – “Stupid electric company…” Jenny whispered as she held her dolls in her arms, standing at the foot of the shelter – “How many times have I called,” said Dad as he entered the room in his bathrobe, his hands shaking, a portend before the quake. At this, Calvin turned just in time to see his mother collapse on the floor, most of her skin melting off into a bloody pile, which reminded Calvin of the first time he had seen a slaughterhouse – on a trip to upstate – after which Calvin was unable to get the screaming of the animals out of his mind, until his parents had helped him overcome that fear.

Jenny was sitting in the corner, playing with her dolls. She dropped one on the floor – or, as it could be said, lost control of one hand first, letting the doll drop, along with what formerly used to be her arm. Jenny could not even cry at this point, her eyes were gone as well, but her last words still came gasping out as she reached with her still intact arm and now less than perfect arm – “Mommy!”

Calvin hardly noticed that he was now on the ground – prone – his skin flowing onto the floor, forming a pool on his left. His mother had come closer, but as he looked to his left, his father was unable to move – being impelled by his lack of feet and arms to remain where he was – still shaking though, but now his whole body and not just his hands. It was at the moment his mother touched him – he couldn’t feel it of course, but he knew it – that his brain liquefied. Even after this had happened, he could still feel his mother’s burnt and bleeding lips touching to his as his broken body lay on the floor at 53 Harrow Drive. “Calvin kissed them goodbye,” he thought with his last breath, “and maybe all of this was here for that kiss.”

Sunday, April 12, 2009

Happy Easter!

Christ is Risen!
Indeed, He is Risen!

A short, but sweet, "Happy Easter!" to all who continue to read my (often un-updated) blog. Thanks for the support!

Saturday, March 21, 2009

A Long Post, but Fun - Intro. to Phil. Syllabus

I had to do an sample syllabus for intro. to philosophy, and I hope to use it one day. I thought some people might enjoy having the reading sample and topic list on the internet for reference. So, at the price of being a long post, I've decided to post it:
The text is Baird's Philosophic Classics: From Plato to Derrida (5th Ed.)

Course Schedule

Week – Date – Readings Topics
1- 01/13/09 Introduction:
  • Syllabus & Course Requirements
  • Texts
  • Outline of Topics Covered
2- 1/15/09

Plato Apology 17a-35d

Plato Republic, Book V: 448e-480a; Book VI-VII, 502c-521b

Plato Phaedo 44a-56a

Origins of Philosophy in Ancient Greece
  • Socrates
  • Death and Trial
  • Plato's Works
  • Philosophy as Way of Life
3- 01/20/09

Aristotle's Metaphysics 1*

Selections from pre-Socratics, Heraclitu,s and Parmenides [online]

*Where title alone is given, or a chapter, read all selections in that work or chapter in the anthology

Introduction to Metaphysics in Ancient Greece
  • Aristotle's Definition of Philosophy – introduction to “metaphysics”
  • Thales and other pre-Socratics
  • Heraclitus
  • Parmenides
  • The Sophists
3- 1/22/09

Plato Crito 6a-13a

Plato Euthypro (selections)

Introduction to Metaphysics in Ancient Greece
  • Socratic and Platonic innovations vs. the Pre-Socratics
  • Platonic response - the Forms
  • Platonic dialectic and the problem of the Good
4- 01/27/09

Plato The Sophist (selections online)

Aristotle Physics II, 192b-193b22, 194b16-195b30, 197a36-199a33

Aristotle and Plato
  • Metaphysics
    • The Common Problem of the One and the Many
    • The Forms/Substantial forms
    • Four Causes
    • Form/Matter composition
    • Substances
4 - 1/29/09

Plato Meno 82-86b

Aristotle Metaphysics, 996a18-997a15, 1003a-1005a18, 1025b3-1027a28

Aristotle On the Soul

Aristotle and Plato
  • Method – Dialectic and Demonstration
    • First principles, strong dialectic, etc.
  • Epistemology
    • Recollection and Passive Intellect
4 – 2/3/09

Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, Books 1 and 2

Plato Republic (selections online)

Aristotle and Plato
  • Ethics
    • Virtue Ethics in Ancient Greece
    • Happiness/Eudaimonia
    • Will and Choice in Plato and Aristotle
    • Moral/Intellectual virtues
    • Atraxia
5 – 2/5/09

First paper assigned

Epicurus Principal Doctrines

Epictetus the Manual (i-v, xxx-xxxvi)

Later Greek Thought
  • Epicurus' and Epictetus – Stoicism and Epicureanism as ethical theories
  • Metaphysics of Epictetus and Epicurus
    • Eleatic influence
5 2/10/09


Plotinus Enneads(all selections)

Later Greek Thought
  • Plotinus and Neo-Platonism
  • Metaphysics and Epistemology
6 - 2/12/09

Augustine Confessions

Anselm Proslogion

Augustine, Boethius, and Anselm – Early Medieval Philosophy
  • Augustine's adoption of Neo-Platonism – The Church Fathers and Greek philosophy
  • Invention of the “will” - problems with free will and ethics (the problem of evil)
  • Intro to Anselm's Ontological Argument
6 – 2/17/09

Anselm Debate over the Ontological Argument

Boethius Consolation of Philosophy

Augustine, Boethius, and Anselm – Early Medieval Philosophy
  • (cont.) Anselm's Ontological Argument
  • Boethius' translations – transition to university as center of learning in High Mid. Ages
7 - 2/19/09

Maimonides Guide for the Perplexed

Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, selections – PP, q. 2, 13, 49

Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia (selections online)

Thomas Aquinas, Occham, and Moses Maimonides - High Medieval Philosophy
  • Distinctive Problems in Medieval Thought
    • Faith/Reason
      • Natural theology in Summa Theologiae, Summa Contra Gentiles
      • Apophantic theology in Maimonides
      • Analogy of names in Aquinas
      • Islamic thought
      • Fideism
    • Metaphysics (essence/existence, subject of, transcendentals/categories, universal hylomorphism, nominalism)
7 – 2/24/09

First Paper Due – one of three prompts

Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, PP, q. 75-83; PPS, q. 3, 9-10, 90-94; SS, q. 23 a 6-8.

Occham, Summa Logicae (Part I, Chapters 14-16)

Thomas Aquinas, Occham, and Moses Maimonides - High Medieval Philosophy
    • (cont.) Metaphysics
    • Natural Law Ethics
    • Epistemology/Logic (nominalism as well as first/second operation of the intellect)
8 - 2/26/09

Catch-up day/Review

In Class Midterm Exam – Ancient and Medieval thought


8 - 3/3/09

Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy I, II, III

Introduction to Modern Philosophy – Humanism, the Reformation, and Epistemological “Metaphysics”
    • Doubt as Method
    • Epistemology
8 – 3/05/09

Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy IV-VI

Gilson Unity of Philosophical Experience (selections online)

Introduction to Modern Philosophy – Humanism, the Reformation, and Epistemological “Metaphysics”
  • Transformation of Metaphysics or Elimination?
9 - 3/10-12 Spring Break
10 - 3/17/09

Pascal Pensees

Spinoza Ethics 1

Interlude
  • Philosophy of Religion
    • Reformation fideism
    • Rationalism
    • Pietism
  • Metaphysics in Spinoza and Leibniz
10 – 3/19/09

Spinoza Ethics 2

Leibniz Monadology

Leibniz Discourse on Metaphysics

Interlude
  • (cont.) Metaphysics in Spinoza and Leibniz
11- 3/24/09

Locke Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (selections to be announced)

Locke Second Treatise (excerpts online)

Modern Epistemology, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion
  • Epistemology of John Locke
    • Empiricism
  • Ethics
    • Natural rights
  • Philosophy of Religion
    • Rationalism and Deism
11 – 3/26/09

Second paper assigned

Berkeley Three Dialogues

Hume Dialogue on Natural Theology (selections online)

Modern Epistemology, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion
  • Idealism
    • Berkeley's idealism
  • Hume's response to idealism foreshadowed
  • Natural Theology
    • Hume's rejection
12 – 3/31/09

Hume Enquiry (excerpts)

Kant Critique of Pure Reason (Introduction, online)

Hume and Kant – Empiricism to Critique
  • Hume's Critique of Empirical Sensations
    • Philosophy of Mind
  • Kant's Response
    • Critique and Transcendental Method
    • Antimonies of Pure Reason
12 – 4/02/09

Kant Prolegomena

Kant Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals

“Kant” in Copleston

Kantian Thought
  • Kant's Metaphysics
  • Kant's Ethics
    • Deontological ethical theory
13 – 4/07/09

Hegel Phenomenology of Spirit

“Hegel” in Copleston

Hegel and German Idealism
  • Metaphysics and Epistemology Become One
    • the Absolute
    • Dialectic and Hegelian “Phenomenology”
13 – 4/09/09

Kierkegaard Concluding Unscientific Postscript

Nietzsche Twilight of the Idols (selections TBA)

Later German Thought
  • Rise of Existential Thought and Ethics
    • Kierkegaard's Inward Turn
  • Nietzsche's Destruction of the Tradition
    • Ethics
    • Rejection of metaphysics
14 – 4/14/09

Second paper due – one of three prompts

Sokolowski Introduction to Phenomenology (selections online)

“Husserl” in Copleston (online)

Heidegger Introduction to Metaphysics (part 1)

The Phenomenological Tradition
  • Phenomenological Method
    • The aim of Husserl's project
    • Transcendental ego
    • “epoche”
  • Heidegger and Metaphysics in phenomenology
14 – 4/16/09

Heidegger Introduction to Metaphysics (part 2)

Sartre Being and Nothingness

Sartre Existentialism is a Humanism

Simone De Beauvoir The Second Sex (Introduction)

Existentialism
  • Metaphysics
    • Heidegger and Sein zum Tode
    • Being and Time
    • Dasein
  • Ethics
    • Bad faith and Freedom
    • Sexuality and gender
15 – 4/21/09

“Gottleib Frege” in Copleston (online)

Wittgenstein Tractatus

Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations (selections)

Logical Positivism” in Copleston (online)

Contemporary Analytic Philosophy
  • Frege and Logical Method
  • Wittgenstein
    • Metaphysics
      • Substance
      • Language
      • Reflection of the world
      • Transformations in later Wittgenstein to language games
    • Ethics
      • Transcendent and mystical
15 – 4/23/09

Quine Two Dogmas of Empiricism (selections)

Derrida Signature, Event, Context (selections)

MacIntyre After Virtue (selections)

MacIntyre First Principles, etc. (selections)

Contemporary Philosophical Problems and Positions
  • Analytic Metaphysics
    • Quine's Ontological Problematic
    • Nominalism
  • Continental Metaphysics
    • Temporality and Truth
    • Derrida
  • Other Issues
    • Virtue ethics?
    • Ontological first principles?
16 – 4/28/09

Catch-up day/Review


Final Exam: May 5, 4-6 pm

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

Undermining from Within

I was looking, as per my habit, at the Google News my Google account collects, and was surprised to see the headline "Pope undermined from within." Innocent ol' me thought, "Well, it's about time! Somebody must have taken note of the unfaithful Catholics who do great damage to the Holy Father, intent on bending the Church to meet their own ideological needs." I was sorely disappointed.
This was in the National Post, with an interview by no less than the former Jesuit editor of "America" magazine. If I had half a decision in the process, that man would be quiet and off somewhere in a hermitage making bumperstickers. But, alas, we get gems like these delivered to us from his eloquent lips: "Rather than thinking like the pope he thinks he is speaking to a classroom of deferential students who won't challenge him. And that's not the world he is working in anymore." Oh, really? Professors are just accepted at face value? Is the Pope really that stupid and gullible? Obviously, Father Reese has a rather interesting view of the education of the Pope; the same who was head of the Congregation for Doctrine of the Faith and engaged in routine public defenses of his positions and the Church's positions. Ah, but alas!
"Frankly, loyalty is more important than competence. They need some people who will challenge the Pope, argue with him." Oh? Apparently, Fr. Reese took exception to the 1962 Missal, the lifting of the excommunications of the traditionalist bishops, the declaration on other Christian churches, and the like. These aren't "new" - the Church routinely teaches, for example, that the old Missal and the Mass in general are holy and good. Similarly, the Church teaches that, sadly enough, Protestants are not Catholic and, as a consequence, are not fully members of the Church we believe Christ founded 2000 years ago. But, of course, Fr. Reese believes that the curia determines whether or not the Pope remains Catholic. If only we had some Jesuits in charge....
"This is the same Benedict who opposed the war in Iraq, who has spoken out about concern for the poor and refugees and for getting humanitarian aid to Africa." Oh, if only we weren't dismayed by the Pope teaching the eternal doctrine of Christ, we would see that he likes the poor! Give me a break.

Friday, December 19, 2008

Prayers to the Saints

The issue arose between myself and some Protestants of whether it is a "Biblical" practice to pray to saints. I think there is an easy argument, first, for the acceptability of saints as models for our edification. I don't know how many would argue with that, as many such examples are clearly Scriptural with the Old Testament, or even in Jesus' parables.
As for prayers, what is the "cash-value" of denying that the saints pray for us? It might seem rather harmless, but I don't think there is a mistake in that the Nicene creed professes "I believe in the communion of saints." There are two ways, to my mind, to consistently deny that the saints pray for us: first, by denying that ANYONE whatsoever can pray for another person. This seems rather harsh even to most Protestants and clearly non-Scriptural according to the many times where people are called upon to offer prayers for each other in the Bible. The other tends to be the usual route among Protestants: denying that people in death "hear our prayers." This either means [1] they do not WISH to pray for us, [2] they CANNOT pray for us. The latter is even further divided into [a] inability from circumstance, or [b] inability purely speaking.
[1] seems rather easily denied, as we can fairly legitimately assume that, if the saints on earth cared for the needs of others, that they would wish to do so after death. Otherwise, they would seem to be uncharitable, with is impossible for the saint. [2]b seems impossible, as the saints could pray on earth and they would have to likewise be able to pray in heaven. Presumably, heaven is a place where the activity is mostly prayer and worship of God, so that it seems very difficult to deny that. [2]a seems to be a variety of the route most Protestants take; the dead cannot, by circumstance, hear prayers. But what does this imply? They seem to take it to mean that their souls do not persist, or that they are "unconcious" to some degree. If this is true, it seems to deny, on one hand, the immortality of the soul, or, on the other, the immediate judgment after death. The latter can also fairly clearly be shown to be false from examples like the parable of Lazarus. Some, however, do dispute that. The clearest proofs I can think of for the life of saints after death, apart from the obvious "eternal life" statements by Jesus, would be the statement, "The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is the God of the living, not the dead," as well as Revelation's picture of the prayers of the saints offered to God.
As a consequence, it seems fairly obvious that denying the existence of the saints and their prayers has rather problematic implications on the whole of Christian doctrine if it is denied. It requires a move that I'm not sure how many Protestants, if they understood this implication, would take. But then again, people amaze.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008

Another letter to the editor on fideism

This is another letter I wrote to the paper, but I'm not sure if it will be published yet:

I blush in writing another letter within the space of a few weeks from my last, but I read just recently a column titled “___” (____). Mr. H writes about religion as a phenomenon of divisiveness, hatred, and fear, one which “burns” and brings with it a great cost of suffering. His view of religion is neatly summarized when he says, “The primary issue is religion can be used to justify anything.” Can it? To the contrary, look up such people as “Bartolomé de las Casas.” Some of his claims, though, are not in dispute - evil men exist within as well as without religion and have used religion as an excuse for their misdeeds. Granting all the evil in the world, that does not however justify his conclusion: religion is not thereby false. But, on a more important note, do religious people merely grasp for whatever a demagogue grants them as the word of the divine?
While I cannot answer this fully, I point to the recent "Regensburg address" of Pope Benedict and wish to refer to one particular phrase: “Not to act reasonably, not to act with logos, is contrary to the nature of God.” There are religions that are fideist, much as Mr. H remarks, and these might well hold that the categories of the rational cannot be applied to God. However, not all or even most religions do. There are and have been religions that take as their founding principle the rationality of faith. While there have been those who stood by or even justified the killing of the Jews in the Holocaust, there was Dietrich Bonhoeffer and many others who went to the camps out of their religious conviction that every man is infinitely precious. While those who rammed planes into the WTC did so out of their twisted religious beliefs, slavery was overturned by religious who embraced non-violent resistance and rational persuasion. While there are those who declared reason to be anathema, there are likewise those who hold that the light which illuminates our reason is the same Word that became flesh in a small town in Palestine.
Saying that “religion is above ridicule” is just dishonest. If Mr. H presumes himself to be the first atheist, he is sorely mistaken. More disturbingly, attempts to bypass rational discussion of religion by calling its followers “idiotic” leads down the same bloody road as the fideism he pretends to abhor, and has led straight to the gulags in other notable places. I suspect that what Dostoyevsky said might quite well be true, that “without God, all is permitted,” as evinced by Mr. H's confusion between religious and moral claims. I fear even more that his explicit project to dispel the light of morality, let alone God, from society might indeed become successful. Then he, as well as I, shall regret that bloody darkness which comes when people reject morality as a “hindrance” to the march of the Volk.

Homosexual Marriage and the Real Issue

This is a letter I wrote in response to a column in my local universities' paper:

These past couple weeks, a recurring question has been that of homosexual "marriage." I appreciate attempts at objectivity by the editors of The _________, but I fear that the news story "____" (___) heavily favored one particular aspect of the debate.

The question at hand in same-sex marriages is not a question of whether or not to discriminate against homosexuals (all agree this is wrong). The issue, rather, is the nature of marriage itself. If the nature of marriage is tied to a certain kind of relationship that excludes same-sex relationships, it has nothing to say either way about the worth of anybody as a human being any more than a zoning prohibition would. The nature of marriage is a complex issue, but not to be confused with "merely" supernatural concern of the religious. The dispute over marriage lies squarely in knowledge available to all rational persons, connected with the deeper question of "What is a human being?"

The classical tradition, in which the Founding Fathers stand, holds that there are natural rights and laws which are prior to any societal determinations of their existence. Human relationships are, in this view, founded in rights and obligations that enable us to become perfect human beings - they are rights and obligations oriented "toward," and not for their own sakes. Sexuality, as a basic potential for relationship, is oriented toward that end of human life in two inseparable ways: union and potential to bring forth life. More simply, it is the potentiality to form a "household" - the basic foundation of society. Marriage, as the natural institution, is the formal "constitution" of that permanent sexual-unitive relationship. It cannot take place, by its very nature, where there is no potential to bring forth life in a stable relationship. Same-sex partners, not possessing this potentiality, cannot be considered to fulfill what that relationship in its essence means, let alone have a "right" to it.

Some endorse "civil unions" as an alternative, but this would be "charity" at the expense of truth. Homosexuals may seek these rights independently, but they cannot be granted to a marital union. These are "marital" rights - recognizing this relation as marital or granting equivalent rights to a "union" is to recognize this relationship as something it cannot be. While I have provided a justification of this view, it is to be noted that the burden of proof is entirely upon the advocate of these unions to prove: [1] the nature of marriage permits these unions, [2] that this is derived from a systematic picture of rights as a whole and [3] that this preserves, rather than undermines, the rest of our picture of rights. Otherwise, we have no reason to assent, even on the pain of being politically incorrect.

If society attempts to re-define or obfuscate the nature of marriage, it does so at its own peril. This position constitutes neither discrimination nor imposition of articles of faith, but a protection of natural rights and, ultimately, society itself.

Sunday, November 30, 2008

The Importance of Liturgy


I was recently reading excerpts from a book titled, "God is Big. Real Big!" by Peter Dresser. The man can't write for jellybeans, but I have to explain the context of my discovery. I was reading about the recent controversy in Australia over the South Brisbane church of St. Mary's and their having been threatened with excommunication by the archbishop-down-under. Personally, I'm quite happy to see people being informed that there are actions and beliefs that do, in fact, make you non-Catholic (such as using invalid baptismal formulae for dubious reasons). Those wonderful folks have a liking for this Fr. Dresser (I believe he is the associate pastor) and his ingeniously titled book which is supposed to make Catholicism, no joke, appetible for "educated Catholics" (I, speaking as a Catholic with a college degree, do not find anything that appeals to my "education" by condescending to me with platitudes about how "big" God is, as if He were some giant stuffed teddy bear).

Nevertheless, there was an important point in his book that I don't think Fr. Dresser understood quite well enough, and I will quote what he said:
"Praxis > Orthopraxis > Orthodoxy"

Of course, for Fr. Dresser, this means that he can do whatever he wants because his own actions don't need to be informed by any other standard. However, there is a deeper and more important, very Catholic, truth to be gleaned from that formulation. One word: liturgy.

There is a liturgical principle that "lex orandi, lex credendi" - the law of prayer is the law of belief. The liturgy is a cosmically important act which brings heaven down to earth and, almost more importantly, earth to heaven. The rites and significant actions performed symbolize and accomplish this very deed. They also speak to what the community believes. But is it a transference from belief to liturgy?

It think Fr. Dresser, amazingly, is on to something quite important - much like Caiaphas, but who's counting? Liturgy began not in creedal statements which became enmeshed in ritual, but in the praxis of Jesus Christ Himself. Even older, in the Jewish Law, the ceremonial precepts gave structure to life that arose out of the revealed words of God. While one shouldn't give precedence to praxis over doctrina, it is amazingly the case that both are indispensably linked. It is the same case as the sacramental principle of the Incarnate Word. As human beings, we encounter God through material media, through actions and ritual, and God Himself used these to encounter us when He took flesh.

The liturgy in the Catholic Church arose from the primal praxis of the apostolic community, who in turn received these rituals and practices from Christ. We already find a rich liturgical life in Acts of the Apostles, where the Apostles and their communities prays at fixed times and communally worship on Sundays. It is interesting to note that Scripture arose from liturgical usage; the Gospels were liturgical books to be read at communal worship, making Jesus present through the memoirs of the apostles.

The early Church Fathers had no qualms in refuting heretics by citing the ancient liturgies, where the words spoken at the Eucharist or other sacraments rebuked their errors. The earliest creeds we have for the Church began as statements of faith professed in the sacrament of baptism. The Eucharistic liturgy was the summit of early Christian life and worship, and we find similar statements in all of the earliest manuscripts. The secrets of the sacraments were jealously guarded so as to not profane what was most sacred.

But praxis went hand-in-hand with ortho-praxis and ortho-doxy. The praxis that took precedence was the praxis of Jesus, not the praxis of Joe Bagofdonuts. This remains the "rule" of the Church, leading to orth-praxis as it was passed on in apostolic succession as Tradition. Ortho-doxy was always tied to the praxis as the end or goal of that praxis - the enjoyment of eternal life with God. Praxis always contains a statement about the intent and content of its project, and the liturgy is no exemption.

This gives great meaning to the motto of Fr. Zuhlsdorf over at What Does the Prayer Really Say?:
Save the Liturgy, Save the World!

Could "energy" be the principle whose existence was intrinsic?

Could energy be the principle whose existence was intrinsic?

If we were to assume the conclusion of our opponents, that energy is an eternal entity, being eternal could not be a sufficient reason for this to be considered intrinsically existing.

If we wanted to admit only material principles, there would be at least three eternal principles: matter, energy, and space. Energy alone would not suffice.

The material principle in things could not suffice as a necessarily existent entity, as matter only exists as informed, being essentially potentiality to receive existence as a particular thing. The function of space is not clear. The reason to gravitate toward energy as the "efficient" principle of activity of matter in a void is necessary to some extent - why else would matter be moving instead of motionless?

"Energy," however, is a distinctly blurry concept in contemporary physics. It indicates any ability to do work, or activity in a material body. Derived from "energia," it can be related as a physical instantiation of the metaphysical "actuality."

Could energy itself be considered the principle which exists intrinsically and necessarily?

There are two issues: first, energy is an abstraction of many particular entities which possess energetic states. Energy is always found in a particular formed entity and as a state in a particular entity. In other words, it is not an existential explanation, per se. It requires a subject which has both formal and material characteristic before it can be an activity therein. As a consequence, energetic states are received and transmitted - they are not entities themselves if we were to refer to "energy" as the activity of a material body.

Second, this is a misplaced understanding of physical energy as an expression of actuality. Actuality as a metaphysical principle indicates existence in general, whereas physical actuality or activity is a subset of this general category. In a certain sense, "energy" would satisfy as a principle of actuality of material bodies, but it cannot satisfy for the existence of actuality as a whole - it can satisfy for their ability to do physical work, but does not account for their existence.

The most obvious way to illustrate this would be to consider again this question from the standpoint of the essence-existence argument:

If one were to suppose that this entity, "energy," was this necessary being whose essence was to exist, we would have to pluralize it only via three ways:
Formal differences, material differences, and reception in different instantiations

The first two are inadequate, as whatever would be a necessary being would be unable to be differentiated in those ways - it would have to retain the same essence without formal differentiation. In reality, energetic states inhere in formally different subjects as well as materially different ones. There is also no single, univocal sort of energetic state that could be said to be this unitary subject. Reception in different matter might seem to be the differentiation proper to this, as we might say that "energy" would constitute the various energy states. But again, then this would not be "energy" but various energetic subjects having received energy.

As a consequence, one might be tempted to see energy as received into various subjects from one subject of energy which is nothing other than pure actuality (in the existential, rather than physical sense). This would be precisely the way in which it would be possible to pluralize this "energy."

We would first have to abandon notions of physical energy and move to the level of existential actuality. Whether such an absolute subject of existential actuality exists, however, has not yet been proven. Given this distinction that is necessary between subjects which are formally constituted and yet receive "energy" or actuality from another, it becomes obvious that the energy states they have are not effect of "themselves" or what they are, but are instead "accidental" to their constitution. This leads one to posit that there need be an absolute subject of actuality, whose essence is "to exist" as pure act, in order to account for the extrinsic reception of the act of existing in various subjects. This would be to require the existence of God, understood as the necessarily existent being whose essence is nothing other than to exist. Only with this being the case could any entity - physical or otherwise - exist.

Saturday, September 6, 2008

Heidegger on Truth and Being

I am working currently on my MA thesis involving the transcendental properties of being in the thought of Aquinas and Heidegger. As a consequence, a lot of my work is critical interpretation of Heidegger. I found this article by Maverick Philosophy W. Vallicella, Heidegger's Reduction of Being to Truth. As I have been reading Heidegger and attempting to understand the changes in his thought, I came to some of the same conclusions Dr. Vallicella did in this article. The problem I see with Heidegger is that his reduction of Being to aletheia makes Being in no real sense intrinsic to beings. Heidegger calls that sort of thinking metaphysics, but I think it truly is a case of the irrelevance of the question if we make the central question of Being unrelated to beings per se. There is a response to this criticism in the same place, which I have yet to read. I can anticipate certain responses from a Heideggarian, which it would be interesting to look at and consider. My own view is that Heidegger requires a theory of transcendentals and the co-related analogia entis in order to form a consistent "metaphysics" in the non-onto-theological sense. But we shall see...

Saturday, August 30, 2008

Thinking within the analytic/continental divide

I have been reading Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy, but have been having some incidental thoughts related to the origins of both the analytic and continental traditions in contemporary philosophy. To my own taste, I find the analytic tradition very appealing in its rigour, as well as its devotion to truth and logical analysis - the likes of a John Haldane or GEM Anscombe remain highly appealing. On the other hand, I simultaneously find a great deal of interesting material within Heidegger and the possibility of reviving ancient and medieval metaphysical questions within the continental phenomenological bent of thought. To my own mind, I'm afraid I don't fall anywhere within these neat categories (nor, I suppose, SHOULD a person interested in essentially ancient and medieval philosophy of the Thomist variety). I think the problem which led to this divide needs to be analyzed in a particular sense: the anti-metaphysical strain of thinking on both sides of the contemporary divide has been what kept each side from talking past each other for the most part of the 20th century. What is necessary, in my humble opinion, is a reform and revival of metaphysics. But how to do this...therein lies the rub.

It brings to mind a quote from Emerson I just read elsewhere on the Internet: "Who in Concord cares for the first philosophy in a book? The woman whose child is to be suckled? The man at Nine-acre-Corner who is to cart sixty loads of gravel on his meadow? the stageman? the gunsmith? Oh, no! Who then?"

Wednesday, August 27, 2008

Schema

I got this schema from Scott MacDonald's article "The Esse/Essentia Argument, ect." in Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives - I thought this was cool enough to load right away. This is the schema of Saint Thomas Aquinas' argument in De Ente et Essentia 4 which argues for a certain metaphysical distinction he is known for (the "real" distinction), and thus proves the existence of God as esse subsistens or "an act of existing which subsits."
Key: "essence" is the principle that makes any entity be "that sort of" entity - it is "what" that thing is.
"esse" is the Latin word for "to be." It is the corresponding principle to "essence" in any entity and it causes that entity to exist.

Here's the schema of the argument:

  1. Whatever belongs to a thing and is not part of its essence either
    1. Come from without and effects a composition with the essence or
    2. Itself constitutes the entire essence
  2. No essence can be understood without its parts
  3. Every essence [except the Divine essence] can be understood without anything being understood about its esse
  4. A thing’s esse is not part of its essence
  5. Suppose that there is something [X] which is esse alone, as esse subsistens
  6. Pluralization occurs in one of only three ways:
    1. By the addition of some differentia,
    2. By a form being received in different matters, or
    3. By onething being absolute and another being received in something.
  7. Anything which is esse alone cannot receive the addition of differentia
  8. X cannot be more than one in virtue of F(a)
  9. Anything which is esse alone cannot receive different matters
  10. X cannot be more than one in virtue of F(b)
  11. If there is anything which is its own esse, there is at most one such thing.
  12. For any other thing besides this one, its esse is other than its essence.
  13. These Y entites are entities other than this esse subsistens.
  14. There is esse besides essence in Y entities
  15. Everything which belongs to something either
    1. Is caused by the principles of its nature or
    2. Comes to it from some extrinsic principle.
  16. A thing’s esse cannot be caused by the thing’s essence [ie, a thing’s esse is not accounted for by O(a)] because it is impossible that a thing produce itself in esse/
  17. It must be that every thing such that its esse is other than its essence has esse from another [ie, a thing’s esse is accounted for by O(b)].
  18. One cannot go to infinity in efficient causes.
  19. There is something which is the cause of esse for all things in virtue of the fact that it is esse alone.
  20. Everything which receives something from another is in potentiality with respect to what is received, and what is received is the actuality of the thing.
  21. All things [other than God] are in potentiality with respect to the esse which they receive from God.
  22. Potentiality and actuality are found in Y entities.

*Bold = conclusions


I want to come back and talk about the metaphysical underpinnings of this argument, analyzing its assumptions.

Later!

Welcome!

I'm just a philosophy graduate student, working on thinking out problems of metaphysics in a contemporary culture. I hope to bring in a little of everything and have a lucid/enlightened philosophical discussion on the Internet - which is a task enough.

Yours,
StMichael